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INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY
AND THE DISCOUNT RATE
FOR POLICY ANALYSIS
JEAN-FRANC ¸OIS MERTENS
CORE, Universit´ e Catholique de Louvain
ANNA RUBINCHIK
University of Haifa
For two independent principles of intergenerational equity, the implied discount rate
equals the growth rate of real per capita income, say, 2%, thus falling right into the range
suggested by the U.S. Ofﬁce of Management and Budget. To prove this, we develop a
simple tool to evaluate small policy changes affecting several generations, by reducing the
dynamic problem to a static one. A necessary condition is time invariance, which is
satisﬁed by any common solution concept in an overlapping-generations model with
exogenous growth. This tool is applied to derive the discount rate for cost–beneﬁt analysis
under two different utilitarian welfare functions: classical and relative. It is only with
relative utilitarianism, and assuming time-invariance of the set of alternatives (policies),
that the discount rate is well deﬁned for a heterogeneous society at a balanced growth
equilibrium, is corroborated by an independent principle equating values of human lives,
and equals the growth rate of real per-capita income.
Keywords: Overlapping Generations, Policy Reform, Intergenerational Equity,
Cost–Beneﬁt Analysis, Discount Rate, Utilitarianism
1. INTRODUCTION
Public decisions often involve trade-offs where economic costs and beneﬁts are
spread over time. The choice of discount rate to map policy effects into net present
value is then crucial. Arguably, at least for long-term projects, the choice should
be governed by principles of intergenerational equity and yet, there is no robust
method for deriving the social discount rate from such principles.
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Traditional cost–beneﬁt analysis (CBA) requires using the interest rate for
present-value calculations.1 Although easy to use, this approach is not compati-
ble with a normative one, as required to study intergenerational equity, because
typically the only corresponding (utilitarian) social welfare function (SWF) im-
plies that the current equilibrium is optimal. Dr` eze and Stern (1987) stress the
importance of formulating a SWF as a basis for policy analysis, and Mertens and
Rubinchik (2010) analyze the implications of consistency between discounting
and a SWF—among others, some form of stationarity in the model.
Recent literature [e.g., Stern (2006) and Arrow (2007), following earlier work
of Arrow and Kurz (1970)] obtains the discount rate for ﬁnal consumption from
a classical welfarist function. This method requires evaluating the ﬁnal impact
of a policy on individual consumption, and thus a full equilibrium computation.
This is why the usual derivations of the discount rate in this framework are for
a discount rate on ﬁnal consumption, and for a single type of agent (or even a
single inﬁnitely lived agent). On the other hand, this method does offer a way
to relate intergenerational equity requirements (through the SWF) to the discount
rate (cf.Section 1.2).
The solution here shares this last advantage with the simplicity of use of the
ﬁrst method; i.e., no equilibrium computation is needed: one can directly discount
policyvariations,e.g.,transfers(endowmentperturbations).Further,heterogeneity
of agents, even in their attitudes toward risk, is handled correctly.
To keep it simple, this paper presents only the main ideas, relegating all the
real difﬁculties to an assumption of differentiability of the SWF as a function
of policy. This differentiability implies in particular both regularity [a fortiori,a
form of determinacy, contrary to the widespread preconception that overlapping-
generations (OG) models are indeterminate] and stability of all balanced growth
equilibria. It is shown to hold generically, in the classical particular case of our
model (one good, one type of agent, etc.), in Mertens and Rubinchik (2009)—thus
providingatleastaproofofnonvacuityfortheresultshere.Thatmethodalsoyields
much richer and deeper results, such as the full expression of all derivatives—in
particular, of all possible impulse responses—and not only the implied discount
rate; and this even (but much less explicitly) with nonstationary policies as
baseline. But for the moment it is still much harder, by orders of magnitude.
1.1. Intergenerational Equity
Even the U.S. Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (OMB) (see Note 1) refers
explicitly to the requirement of equity vis-` a-vis future generations, and acknowl-
edges it by suggesting, for projects with substantial long-term impact, a further
analysis at a rate “between 1 and 3%” (p.36), with no further precision.2
The issue of discounting utility and, more broadly, intergenerational justice has
been controversial in the literature3 since, probably, Sidgwick (1874, p. 414).4
Ramsey (1928) (p. 543) presents discounting future utility (“enjoyments”) as a
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the imagination.” He suggests a way to overcome technical difﬁculties of con-
structing a discount-free utilitarian social welfare criterion using the differences
between actual and “bliss” utility levels. Utility discounting is not required per se
in our case either, as we evaluate temporary policy changes, and thus aggregate
utility differences from a baseline.5
1.2. Welfarist Deduction of the Discount Rate
OnecouldfollowArrowandKurz(1970),as,e.g.,inStern(2006)andinDasgupta
(2008).
For simplicity, take a discrete-time model where individuals live for just one
period, with utility function U(c) = c1−ρ
1−ρ, where ρ>0. The economy is on a
balanced growth path with per capita consumption growing exponentially at rate
γ>0,productionbeingblack-boxedfornow.Thebaselinepercapitaconsumption
at time t is c0eγt, with c0 > 0. Consider a policy that involves a variation in
aggregate consumption δCt for each generation t. It is to be evaluated at time 0,
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social discount rate is ργ + β, whereas there is no interest rate, because agents
live for one period.
There are two major conceptual difﬁculties with this approach.
First, even if one is to rely on this simplistic model, it provides no guidance for
obtaining an intergenerationally fair discount rate.
In a welfarist interpretation, only the indifference map is retained as an in-
dividual characteristic, so the choice of utility representation is thought of as a
parameter of the welfare function (here, ρ). Hence this theory merely substitutes
for a unknown number, the discount rate, an even less known function U and
parameter β.
This is illustrated, e.g., by the recent controversies about Stern’s report
[Arrow (2007); Stern (2007)] and is typically settled by arbitrarily ﬁxing one
of those parameters (ρ or β) to get a “reasonable” discount rate.
In contrast, in a utilitarian interpretation, one views ρ as the individual coefﬁ-
cientofrelativeriskaversionwithrespecttolifetimeincome,i.e.(oralternatively),
as the income elasticity of the marginal utility of income. Even when interpreting,
then, intergenerational equity as meaning β = 0, reasonable estimates of β + ργ
still vary widely (cf. Section 6), and there is evidence of substantial variation of ρ
within the population.
We postpone the discussion of the estimates for this social discount rate to
Section 6, once it is established.64 JEAN-FRANC ¸OIS MERTENS AND ANNA RUBINCHIK
More importantly, this example is misleadingly simple: in particular, because
individuals live only one period, they have no incentive to save, so there can be
no capital accumulation and growth. When there is growth and savings, there is
also an interest rate, which individuals would use to smooth the shock over their
lifetime, each according to their own time preferences, so one might expect the
resulttobedrivenbacktotheinterestrate.Thus,toestablishsucharesult,weneed
at least a growth model (to see the parameter γ coming out), with generations,
to be able to talk of intergenerational equity, and those should overlap lest there
be no capital accumulation and hence no growth—shortly, an OG model. Finally,
nonzero population growth must be used, so γ is unambiguously distinguished
from the (e.g., golden rule) interest rate. The reason for using exogenous growth
in this model will be explained after Assumption 3 in Section 4.2.
In addition, a major difﬁculty with the above approach is that for a policy to be
evaluated, it has to be translated into changes in personal consumption, which are
then discounted; further, just computing the change in aggregate consumption (as
intheaboveexample)isnotsufﬁcientassoonasindividualsdiffer,whetherintheir
preferences or in their endowment. Hence the method requires a full equilibrium
computation, taking into account all aftereffects of the policy shock as well as its
anticipatory effects. For instance, even for a lump-sum transfer policy, it would be
wrong to aggregate changes in individual utility as if individuals consumed their
transfer, because the recipient might well experience a welfare loss in competitive
equilibrium (transfer paradox).
1.3. The Solution
We start with the simplest general model, which has only two elements: a policy
(as a function of time) and an objective function deﬁned over policies. In this
model, we ask what property of the objective function ensures that its derivative
has a net present value form, i.e., the sum of discounted policy changes at each
point in time. The desired property is time invariance (a function over policies is
an invariant welfare function (an IWF) when a time shift of policies multiplies
welfare by a constant and adds a constant); this fact is established in Theorem 1,
which also shows how to calculate the discount rate.
To apply this main result, we consider a growth model (OG), as required (cf.
supra), in a general equilibrium fashion, adding the minimal assumptions needed
for the existence of balanced growth equilibria, and prove that the composite
map—from policies to individual allocations, then to individual utilities, them-
selves aggregated into welfare—is an IWF. This result stems explicitly from the
properties of the individual maps involved in the composition, in particular, that
the ﬁrst map is an outcome function (Deﬁnition 10), for example, the selection of a
locally unique equilibrium in the neighborhood of a balanced growth equilibrium
(BGE).6
The composite map is an IWF, so, without any equilibrium computation,t h e
change in welfare resulting from policy perturbations has a discounted sum form,
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In sum, our main result rationalizes the commonly practiced net present value
calculation for a broad set of economies and policies.
In particular, we allow heterogeneous preferences (e.g., ρ), only requiring ho-
mogeneity of individual lifetime utility with respect to consumption, which is
needed for balanced growth. Time separability is not necessary. Durable and
storable goods are included (Section 3.1.2), so agents can smooth shocks over
time, when those are represented as endowment perturbations.
Finally, to describe naturally the anticipation of policy variations, time starts at
−∞ rather than 0.7 Continuous time is at ﬁrst sight only a matter of convenience,
or of more transparency, and a general precaution to avoid pathologies associated
with discrete time; however [cf. also Demichelis and Polemarchakis (2007)], it
maywellprovecrucialtoavoidindeterminacy,6 whichwouldhavemadeourresult
vacuous. The proof of nonvacuity itself is in Mertens and Rubinchik (2009).
1.4. Results for the Social Discount Rate
The two welfare functions we consider yield different social discount rates as
applied to monetized policies in the OG model.
Classical utilitarian welfare with homogeneous preferences. Discounting is
still valid, and with rate ργ + β, exactly as in the example in Section 1.2, though
we deal with a very different concept: the endowment equivalent of policies is
being discounted, not the ﬁnal consumption.
Classical utilitarian welfare with heterogeneous preferences. If preferences
with respect to lifetime consumption differ across agents, the derivative of the
classical utilitarian welfare function with respect to policies does not exhibit
the discounted sum form anymore, even when allowing for any form of time-
dependent discounting.
Relative utilitarian welfare. This welfare function is the sum of individual
von Neumann–Morgenstern (VNM) utilities, 0–1 normalized on the feasible set
(which will be assumed time-invariant too).8 Now the social discount rate is well
deﬁned even for heterogeneous preferences, and equals the growth rate of per
capita GDP, γ, say, 2% per year.9
1.5. Roadmap
Section 2 presents the basic tool for evaluating policy reforms. In Section 2.2, the
outcome map (IWF) is fully abstracted, as a map from policies to welfare (as in
decision theory); so this would also cover models with a single decision maker,
or an inﬁnitely lived agent. In Section 2.3, this is applied to a model with a bit
more structure, more appropriate for an economy with ﬁnitely lived agents: the
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choice theory), and the aggregation is done explicitly, enabling use of the previous
result. For further usage, the results are particularized to the classical aggregation
in Section 2.4 (Theorem 2).
Section 3.1 describes the overlapping-generations economy with exogenous
growth, and then Section 3.2 deﬁnes outcome maps for this model as having still
more structure, being now maps from policies to allocations. The time-invariance
requirement on them is carefully justiﬁed by exhibiting an automorphism of the
economy (uniquely) associated with time shifts. The result of Section 2 is then
applied to this economy in Section 4, to derive the discount rates implied by
the classical (Section 4.1) and relative utilitarian (Section 4.2) criteria, with quite
differentimplications.Ineachcase,weﬁrstcomputethederivativeofwelfarew.r.t.
policyvariationsonanabstractpolicyspace,andthenapplythistoaspeciﬁcpolicy
space of lump-sum taxes and subsidies, thought of as representing the monetized
value of public projects, to derive the discount rate for cost–beneﬁt analysis.
An alternative derivation of γ as the discount rate, based on the value of a
human life, is presented in Section 5. Merits of the two criteria are then discussed
in Section 6. Concluding remarks in Section 7 address the issues of evaluating the
static component of the derivative of welfare and of nonvacuity of the results.
In the formal treatment below, the proofs are kept to a minimum; longer proofs
are deferred to Appendix B.
2. DIFFERENTIATING WELFARE WITH RESPECT
TO POLICY VARIATIONS
Here we start with the simplest model that yields a discount rate, including only
policies and an objective function deﬁned on them. We formulate a sufﬁcient
condition for the derivative of the objective to be of the net-present-value form.
Although initially one might ﬁnd this condition rather abstract, it is satisﬁed by
utilitarianwelfarefunctionsinbalancedgrowthequilibriaofOGmodels,asshown
in Section 4.
Notation 1. R is the extended real line, R ∪{ + ∞ }∪{ − ∞ } .
For f ∈ E , the dual of a topological vector space E,  f,e 
def = f(e).
2.1. The Basic Model
2.1.1. Policies. First we describe a general space, F, of policy changes. An
easy example is the space of continuous functions with compact support and the
sup norm.
DEFINITION 1.
(i) Let th: t  → t +h be the translation by h on R; and let Sh: ξ  → ξ ◦t−h be the time
shift on functions of time.
(ii) Fix a Banach space E. KE is the set of inﬁnitely differentiable functions ϕ: R → E
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(iii) F is a topological vector space of E-valued functions s.t.
(1) ShF ⊆ F.
(2) KE is a dense subset of F.
(3) If ϕn ∈ KE and its successive derivatives converge uniformly to 0 and ∃h ∈
R: |x| ≥ h ⇒ ϕn (x) = 0 ∀n,t h e nϕn → 0 in F.
Remark 1. KE ={ ϕ: R → E |∀ f ∈ E∗,f ◦ ϕ ∈ KR}.
Next, we move to the deﬁnition of policies. Basic policies are time-independent
speciﬁcations of government actions. They belong to a Banach space, because
income tax schedules, for example, are already in a function space. The baseline
is some basic policy kept constant over time. A policy (reform) is a deviation from
the baseline.
DEFINITION 2.
(i) (B, ¯ π) is the set B of basic policies, open in the Banach space E, together with
some point ¯ π ∈ B, called the baseline policy.
(ii) P is the set of policies π : t  → π(t) ∈ B s.t. δπ = π − ¯ π ∈ F.
ThepolicyspaceP isshift-invariant,asisF;i.e.,policiescanbeshiftedintime.
Deﬁnition 4 below implies that this shift must be meaningful; so we have to think
about a basic policy as expressed in time-invariant terms. This implies, in partic-
ular, that a basic policy has to be unit-free and nondiscriminatory, not prescribing
date-speciﬁc actions or special treatment of particular individuals or generations,
to be applicable at any time. For example, the income-tax part of a policy would
satisfy this if brackets of the rate-schedule were indexed to per capita income.
More precisely, in an OG model, a basic policy, if kept constant over time,
should lead to balanced growth (Lemma 7).
The policy space is basically unrestricted until now; for instance, with B = R,
one can very well have as a space of policies the space of all continuous functions
withthetopologyofuniformconvergence oncompact sets.Restrictionswillcome
throughthefollowingsetZF,whichwillbeneededthroughoutthepaper,toimpose
conditions that some parameter belongs to it. Those conditions translate thus as
an integrability requirement on policies (think of the case where the parameter is
zero), hence excluding permanent deviations, such as a constant policy different
from ¯ π.Iftheparameterisnon-null,itisroughlytheminimalspeedofconvergence
to ¯ π required of policies.
DEFINITION 3. ZF ={ ζ ∈ R |∀ q ∈ E ,f  →

eζt q,f(t) dt ∈ F  }.11
2.1.2. Objective function
DEFINITION 4. W : P → R is an invariant welfare function (IWF) if ∃ Le-
besgue-measurable ah,b h > 0: ∀h ∈ R,W◦ Sh = ah + bhW.
Remark 2. That is, VNM preferences on P are shift-invariant if and only if
their representation W is an IWF.68 JEAN-FRANC ¸OIS MERTENS AND ANNA RUBINCHIK
Example
Consider again the (nonequilibrium) Arrow–Kurz-like setup described in the In-
troduction, and, time being discrete, take h integer. Let E = R, with baseline
¯ π = 0. There is one individual per period. Policy is a consumption pertur-
















π(t )) − U(c0eγt 
)],t   = t − h
by homogeneity of U.S oW(Shπ)= e(γ(1−ρ)−β)hW(π): W is invariant.
LEMMA 1. For an IWF W there exist constants ζ and A ∈ R s.t. ah and bh
in Deﬁnition 4 can be taken as ah = Aeζh−1
eζ−1 , bh = eζh, the ratio being deﬁned
by continuity at ζ = 0. Such a ζ is unique if W takes at least two different real
values. ζ is called the parameter of the IWF.
Proof. Use Lemma 8 in Appendix A, identifying values of W with constant
R-valued functions of time.
2.2. The Main Tool
Recall that a map is Gˆ ateaux-differentiable on F if it has directional derivatives
in each direction, which are a continuous linear function of the direction. This is
the weakest form of differentiability. We will need an extension of this form of
differentiability for correspondences:
DEFINITION 5. An R-valued correspondence   with domain in F is G-dif-
ferentiable at x iff every f : F → R, s.t. f(y) ∈  (y) when  (y) is deﬁned
and nonempty, is s.t. f(x)∈ R, and Gˆ ateaux differentiable at x. Their (common)
Gˆ ateaux differential is then the G-differential of  at x.
THEOREM 1. If an IWF W with parameter ζ ∈ ZF is G-differentiable on P
at ¯ π, then its differential equals

eζt q,δπ(t) dt for some q ∈E  .
The theorem justiﬁes discounting, i.e., shows that the time component of the
derivative of welfare is exponential in time, with a time-independent shadow price
q applied to current policy changes δπ(t).DISCOUNT RATE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 69
MertensandRubinchik(2009)provide(some)toolstoprovethedifferentiability
assumption.
Next we express the discount rate ζ in terms of the parameters of an OG model.
The ﬁrst step is to move from the objective of a single decision maker to a welfare
aggregator over individual utilities.
2.3. Constructing an IWF
This section provides sufﬁcient conditions for a welfare function to be an IWF in
an OG model. They are twofold. The ﬁrst relates individual lifetime utilities over
policies (Deﬁnition 6); the second restricts the aggregator (Deﬁnition 7).
2.3.1. Population. Individuals differ by type τ ∈   (  ﬁnite) and by birth-
date, x ∈ R. They have life length Tτ, and Nτ
xdx = Nτ
0eνxdx is the number of
births in (x,x + dx).
2.3.2. Utilitiesoverpolicies. Assumenowthatindividuallifetimeutilityfunc-
tions are deﬁned over policies. The time-invariance property below requires that
whenever any policy π is delayed by h the resulting utility proﬁle v(Sh(π)) equals
that under π up to an afﬁne transformation when also shifting the dates of birth
of the agents: shifting policies and agents preserves interpersonal comparisons of
utility differences.
DEFINITION 6. A proﬁle v of R-valued functions vτ
x deﬁned on P is a valu-
ation if it is weakly shift-invariant, i.e., ∃ Lebesgue-measurable ah ∈ R ,b h >
0: ∀h ∈ R,v◦ Sh = ah + bhSh ◦ v. The proﬁle is a strict valuation if it is
shift-invariant, i.e., if ah = 0,b h = 1.
There is a simple translation of a valuation into a strict one:
LEMMA 2. For a valuation v there exist constants A ∈ R  and   ∈ R s.t.
uτ
x = Aτ 1−e− x
e −1 + e− xvτ
x is a strict valuation, with x for the ratio at   = 0.  
is unique except if ∀τ, vτ
x1(π1) = vτ
x2(π2) whenever vτ
xi(πi) ∈ R.   is called the
parameter of the valuation.
Proof. By Lemma 8, with n = # , bh = e h and ah = Ae h−1
e −1 for some
constants A and  , the ratio being h for   = 0. The rest is obvious.
COROLLARY 1. For a valuation v and a constant policy π, vτ
x(π) is of the
form e xvτ(π) + Cτ.
Proof. Apply Lemma 2, and for v strict, use the deﬁnition.
Thus the parameter   is the rate of growth of individual utility scales over
policies. It will be further disentangled in Propositions 2 and 3 into growth effects





(utility-proﬁles),s.t.∃Lebesgue-measurable ah,b h > 0: ∀h ∈ R,V◦
Sh = ah + bhV—i.e., V is weakly shift-invariant.12
A proof similar to that of Lemma 1 yields now
LEMMA 3. ah and bh in Deﬁnition 7 can be taken as ah = a ech−1
ec−1 , bh = ech,
the ratio being deﬁned by continuity at c = 0. c is unique if V t a k e sa tl e a s tt w o
different real values. c is called the parameter of the IWA.
Given the goal of evaluating policy changes from the baseline, it is natural
to aggregate individual utility differences from the baseline. Thus we assume
henceforth, for any valuation v, that vτ
x(¯ π)∈ R ∀τ. This condition is independent
of x by Corollary 1.
LEMMA 4. Take a valuation v with parameter  , and a IWA Vc,r with param-
eter c, positively homogeneous of degree r.
Then W(·)
def = Vc,r(v(·) − v(¯ π))is an IWF with ζ =  r + c.
If the valuation is strict, homogeneity is not needed, and ζ = c.
We could continue and use general IWAs throughout (homogeneous in Sec-
tion 4.1); however, for concreteness, and to have an explicit parameter c,w e
concentrate henceforth on the classical case, and ﬁrst summarize for future use
our results for that case.
2.4. The Utilitarian Aggregator
The two social welfare functions (SWF) used in Section 4 are based on the same
utilitarianaggregator.Itmay,however,bejustacorrespondence,e.g.,astheintegral
in Deﬁnition 8 may very well diverge for some policies, so some additional care
is required.





x(¯ π))dx, understood as the interval between the lower
and upper wide Denjoy integrals [e.g., Gordon (1994)].13
LEMMA 5. For a valuation v with parameter  , and S∗ the upper bound of S
(the upper integral), S∗(v) is an IWF with ζ =   + ν − β.
Proof. S∗(v) = W of Lemma 4, using the IWA, with degree r = 1 and
parameter c = ν − β, Vc,r : u  →




THEOREM 2. Let v be a valuation with parameter  .I fW = S(v) is G-
differentiable on P at ¯ π and  +ν −β ∈ ZF, then ∃q ∈ E s.t. W’s G-differential
at ¯ π equals

e( +ν−β)t q,δπ(t) dt.
Proof. ζ =  +ν −β ∈ ZF. G-differentiability of W implies that of S∗, whose
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We obtain thus β − ν −   as discount rate for policies. Our purpose in the next
two sections is to identify the last parameter,  , in terms of economic primitives
in an OG model.
3. A GROWING ECONOMY
Valuations with their built-in time invariance might seem conﬁned to stationary
economies, but they also arise naturally in models with exogenous growth. We
imposeonlytheminimalconditionsrequiredfortheexistenceofbalancedgrowth:
homogeneity of utility functions with respect to consumption, constant returns
to scale in production, absence of land and natural resources, and labor-saving
technological growth.
3.1. The Economy
3.1.1. Consumption and labor. Instantaneous consumption is a nonnegative
bundleofnconsumptiongoodsandhfractionsoftotaltimeallocatedtohdifferent
types of labor. Individual preferences over lifetime streams of time allocation and
consumption bundles are described by a utility function Uτ, homogeneous of
degree 1 − ρτ in consumption. There are two interpretations of the parameter
ρτ: (1) relative risk aversion coefﬁcient and (2) income elasticity of the marginal
utility of income. Indeed, by ﬁxing consumption prices and relative wages, labor
income varies linearly with the wage level, by homogeneity, so the individual
indirect utility function, as a function of labor income, has, by homogeneity, the
speciﬁed relative risk-aversion coefﬁcient or elasticity.
The fraction of time, zτ
i (s,t), devoted at date t to activity i by an agent of type
τ and age s is multiplied by a nonnegative and integrable efﬁciency factor ετ
i (s) to
formeffective time.Effectivetimedevoted atdatet toanyactivityismultipliedby
eγt to form effective labor input, eγtετ
i (s)zτ
i (s,t), thus representing labor-saving
technological progress.
Example
With γ = 0 and ε(s) = 1 in the ﬁrst part of life and zero thereafter, the model is a
continuous-time reinterpretation of the standard OG model, as, e.g., in Samuelson
(1958) or Gale (1973).
3.1.2. Production. There are m capital goods and a corresponding invest-
ment good for each, linked by the usual capital accumulation equation, Ki  (t) =
Ii(t) − δiKi(t),14 Ki ≥ 0 denoting capital and Ii investment of type i, with δi
as depreciation rate. Consumption and investment goods are manufactured instan-
taneously by production ﬁrms from (the services of) capital and effective labor
(and, possibly, from investment), with as instantaneous production set a closed
convex cone Y ⊆ Rh
− × Rm
− × Rm × Rn of production vectors (−L,−K,I,C),
satisfying the classical free-disposal and irreversibility (Y contains no straight
line) conditions. An investment ﬁrm of type i acquires capital Ki(t0) at time t0,72 JEAN-FRANC ¸OIS MERTENS AND ANNA RUBINCHIK
chooses investment ﬂows, rents out accumulated capital to production ﬁrms, and
sells Ki(t1) at time t1 >t 0.
Investmentgoodscanbeviewedbothasoutputsandasinputs.E.g.,disvestment
is crucial to model resource extraction. Or, to model a storable good, introduce a
corresponding investment good and capital good (“the good in storage”). A pro-
duction ﬁrm creates the storable investment good, purchased by an intermediary
investment (“storage”) ﬁrm that transforms it into the corresponding capital good,
which has no use in production. At the time of consumption, the investment ﬁrm
disinvests and sells the corresponding investment good to a production (“market-
ing”) ﬁrm, which transforms it one to one into the corresponding consumption
good. So allow all investment ﬁrms to disinvest as well as invest in all goods;
restrictions on disinvestment are described by Y.
To include consumer durables, introduce the corresponding investment and
capital goods. A production ﬁrm creates the durable investment good, purchased
by an intermediary investment ﬁrm, which rents the capital good out to a leasing
productionﬁrm,whichproduceswiththiscapitaltheconsumptiongood(services),
purchased by consumers.
3.1.3. Initial condition. This section ensures that the production set (set of
feasible input and output paths) is well deﬁned. Indeed, the formula in Lemma 6
implies that Ki(·) is uniquely determined by Ii(·), but does not sufﬁce for any
investment policy (e.g., I is a function of current K instead of time, cf. example
infra) to have a well-determined outcome.
To ensure its boundedness, assume capital cannot reproduce itself:
Assumption 1 (No Rabbit Economy). (0,−K,I,0) ∈ Y ⇒ I ≤ 0.
Remark 3. Observe that although production of durables, as described before,
involves a production of consumption good with only capital and no labor input,
it does not violate our assumption on Y that no investment good can be produced
without some form of labor input. Similarly, production activities (as for storable
goods)transforminginvestmentgoodsonetooneintoconsumptiongoods,without
any capital or labor input, do not violate this assumption.
To see the need for Assumption 1, consider the following “rabbit economy”:
Example
Assume a single good, a single type of labor, and a CES production function
(AKα + BLα)1/α, A1/α ≥ R with R = γ + ν + δ. In order to get an upper
bound on capital and investment, consider a path with all agents working full
time and consuming nothing. Note that Lt = L0e(γ+ν)t,s of o rD = BLα
0,
K (t) = [AKα(t)+Deα(γ +ν)t]1/α − δK(t); or with x(t) = K(t)e−(γ +ν)t,
x (t) = [Axα(t)+D]1/α − Rx(t) ≥ D1/α > 0. Because x(t) ≥ 0, there is no
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are x(t) = Ce(A1/α−R)t, with C ≥ 0 arbitrarily large, so K(t)is unbounded in this
case too.
As for any differential equation, initial conditions are needed. Their natural
form is that the capital stock Kt converges at −∞ to given initial values, which
become part of the description of the techology. Note that non-null initial values
can occur only for capital goods with δi = 0, corresponding to land and resources.
But, for balanced growth, those initial values must be zero, thus ruling out land
and natural resources:
Assumption 2 (Initial Condition). Let δ = mini δi. Then eδtKt converges
exponentially fast to 0 along some sequence t →− ∞ .
Also assume R




−∞ eδi(s−t)Ii(s)ds, where the L1-norms of all feasible integrands are
bounded by a constant times e(γ+ν)t; in particular, the integral is a Lebesgue integral.
(ii) Let it = e−(γ+ν)tIt, kt = e−(γ+ν)tKt. There exists ¯ K s.t. along any feasible path,  b
a  it dt ≤ ¯ K(b− a + 1) for any pair a ≤ b, and (hence)  kt ≤ ¯ K.
Remark 4. As explained and addressed in Appendix C, the initial condition is
a bit too stringent conceptually, requiring exponential convergence to 0 instead of
just plain convergence. This is not crucial in this paper: land and natural resources
being ruled out anyway by the need for balanced growth, it is natural to expect all
δi > 0, so just Kt bounded at −∞ already ensures exponential convergence to 0.
3.2. Time-Invariant Solution Concepts
To apply the main result, one has to obtain time-invariant proﬁles of utilities, or a
valuation v for this economy.
Consider, to ﬁx ideas, a map from policies to corresponding equilibria. It in-
duces a proﬁle of utility functions over policies. For this to be a valuation, a
very natural consistency requirement must hold. When a policy is delayed, the
resulting allocation should be the same as under the original policy, only in a
transformed economy, with time shifted and quantities scaled up appropriately.
Say the policy increases the income tax rate by 1% above a given quantile of the
income distribution for 10 years and returns to the baseline thereafter. Delaying
it by a year should induce the same response of the economy as applying it
today, renaming the affected agents (and dated goods), and rescaling all quantities
according to their growth rate. More precisely,
DEFINITION 9. The transformation Th
(i) applies Sh to allocations and production plans;
(ii) multiplies individual consumption bundles by eγh;
(iii) multiplies aggregates—effective labor, capital, investment, and consumption—by
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Remark 5. Equivalently, Th shifts the origin of time back by h, multiplies
populationmeasureandthusallaggregatesbyeνh,anddividesunitsofallnonlabor
goods by eγh.
DEFINITION 10. An outcome function ς is a map from policies to individual
allocations, which is invariant under all Th: Th ◦ ς = ς ◦ Sh.
Remark 6. We abstract away the exact nature of outcome functions, keeping
only the time-invariant structure, to blackbox the policy space.
The rest of this section justiﬁes Deﬁnition 10, in Section 3.2.2, gives exam-
ples of outcome functions in Section 3.2.3, and further, in Section 3.2.5, de-
ﬁnes balanced growth paths and shows that they are the outcomes of constant
policies.
3.2.1. Isomorphism between Arrow–Debreu economies. To motivate Deﬁ-
nition 9, ﬁrst deﬁne isomorphism between two Arrow–Debreu economies with
ﬁnitely many goods and individuals. They are isomorphic if there is a linear map
ξ from the commodity space of one economy to that of the other and there are
one-to-one mappings from the sets of individuals and of ﬁrms of one to those of
the other such that
(i) the consumption set, preferences, and endowment of any agent in the ﬁrst economy
are mapped by ξ to those of the corresponding agent in the second economy;
(ii) the production set of each ﬁrm in one economy is mapped by ξ to that of the
corresponding ﬁrm in the second;
(iii) shareholdings are preserved.
When consumption sets are the nonnegative orthant, it must be that ξ maps the
commodity names in the ﬁrst economy one to one to those in the second, together
with appropriate rescalings (changes of unit).
Another aspect of isomorphism, which is more familiar with a continuum of
agents, is to multiply the population measure by a positive constant C. Share-
holdings refer then for each ﬁrm to a probability distribution over the agents;
and the one-to-one mapping of agents has to be understood to be measurable,
as well as its inverse, and such that the induced map on measures maps the
ﬁrst population measure to 1/C times the second. Further, the ﬁrms’ production
sets, as well as points therein, are multiplied by C (in addition to the above
rescalings).
When production has constant returns to scale, as here (capital-accumulation
equations are linear, and the instantaneous production sets, cones), sharehold-
ings become irrelevant (proﬁts being zero), and multiplication by C maps the
production set onto itself.
The isomorphism is equivalently described by a single linear bijection (with
the required structure) between the allocation spaces (product of all consumption
sets and production sets) of both economies. For the isomorphism property, it
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endowments,andpreservespreferences,andthatpopulationmeasuresaremapped
to each other by the induced map of agents and the multiplication by C, obtaining
C from how the map behaves on production sets as compared to consumption
sets.
We will use this below with a new twist, in that indeed the mass of each agent
is multiplied by C, but with as ﬁnal effect to preserve the population measure, it
being σ-ﬁnite.
3.2.2. Time-invarianceintheOGmodel. ThetranformationTh deﬁnedabove
is a particular case of such isomorphisms: it maps an agent of type τ born at time
t to an agent of the same type born at t +h, multiplying his mass by eνh, and maps
any good dated t to the same good dated t + h, multiplying nonlabor quantities
by eγh, and labor quantities by 1. Individual time is not a good (not marketed), so
the linear ξ map of Section 3.2.1 is applied using the equivalent vector of effective
time. Thus,
PROPOSITION 1. Th is an automorphism of the economy.
Now, Th mapping the economy to itself h time-units later, and policies being unit-
free,thecorrespondingoperationonpoliciesisapuretime-shift,withoutrescaling.
So, natural solution concepts having the invariance properties of the model, Th
must transform solutions of π to those of Shπ. This justiﬁes Deﬁnition 10.
3.2.3. Examples of outcome functions. A ﬁrst example maps a policy π to a
locally unique equilibrium close to that of the baseline ¯ π, deﬁning the map in an
arbitrary invariant way elsewhere.
Indeed, if such a selection exists, then it should satisfy invariance: time-shifts
map the balanced growth path to itself, so neighboring paths are mapped in its
neighborhood; hence, by local uniqueness, the selection is mapped to itself.15
The next example is the maximization of a time-invariant social welfare func-
tion, say a utilitarian one, provided the maximum is unique.
Another example is the “identity map”: policies are perturbations of ﬁnal con-
sumption. This way our results also yield the usual, nonequilibrium approach to
discounting.
One way to model policy surprises is to assume the contracts signed (“at the
beginning of time”) in anticipation of the baseline policy cannot be changed, so
in the wake of an unexpected policy change, individuals sign additional contracts
taking their baseline consumption as new endowment. The initial equilibrium
being a balanced growth equilibrium, the economy with that endowment is also
time-invariant, and the resulting map from policies is again an outcome function
if the ﬁnal allocation is locally unique. At least when policies are lump sum taxes
and beneﬁts (endowment perturbations), this case is particularly simple, as net
individual demand under the baseline prices is zero, so income effects disappear
and the variation in individual utility depends just on the value of the endowment
perturbation.76 JEAN-FRANC ¸OIS MERTENS AND ANNA RUBINCHIK
3.2.4. The case of indeterminacy. Even if dealing with a situation that does
not guarantee local uniqueness, one can choose the prices closest to those in the
initialequilibriumintermsofthe L∞-norm

i  lnpi(t) − ln ¯ pi(t) ∞, ¯ p(t)being
the baseline price system (or equivalent ones, e.g., the L∞-norm of the  2-norm
over i of the ln differences). Though the price system does not necessarily specify
an equilibrium, it does specify the individual utility levels, which is sufﬁcient for
welfare analysis. The logarithms make the distance independent of price normal-
ization, and hence induce a distance between price rays: for any multiple of ¯ pi,t h e
minimum, over all multiples of pi, will be achieved at the corresponding multiple,
and the value of the minimum is independent of this multiple, and remains the
same when the roles of ¯ pi and pi are permuted. Finally, the L∞-norm being
shift-invariant, the selection will be time-invariant. If the set of minimizers is
not a singleton, their correspondence can be expected to be sufﬁciently thin so
that hopefully any outcome function obtained as an invariant selection (using the
axiomofchoice)genericallysatisﬁesthedifferentiabilityrequirement—e.g.,asin
Mertens and Rubinchik (2009), discussed in Section 7. Finally, because Theorem
2 already allows for a correspondence, one could similarly extend Deﬁnition 10,
to obviate the need to appeal to the axiom of choice in such cases.
But this is only one example of how to possibly construct outcome functions in
thecaseofindeterminacy(whichwedonotexpecttooccurinthemodelofSection
3.1); there should be a continuum of such outcome functions then. Because our re-
sults below hold for any of them, conceivably with a linear functional q depending
on the chosen outcome function, the discount rate is established even then.
3.2.5. Balanced growth
DEFINITION 11. A balanced growth path is a T-invariant allocation.
On a balanced growth path individual labor is independent of the birthdate, indi-
vidual consumption grows at rate γ, and all aggregate inputs and outputs at rate
γ +ν, as in the standard (1 type, 1 good) case [e.g., Arrow and Kurz (1970), King
et al. (2002)].
The following sharpens the interpretation of basic policies; see Corollary 1:
LEMMA 7. The outcome of a constant policy is a balanced growth path.
Proof. By Deﬁnition 10, it is mapped to itself by any Th.
4. THE DISCOUNT RATE
The discount rate for cost–beneﬁt analysis depends on the social welfare function.
We consider both relative and classical utilitarianism.
Let v = U ◦ ς be the proﬁle of utility functions on P induced by the proﬁle of
utility functions U and the outcome function ς. Assume vτ
x(¯ π)∈ R ∀τ.
4.1. The Classical Utilitarian Approach
In Section 4.1 we assume (1 − ρτ)γ + ν − β ∈ ZF ∀τ.DISCOUNT RATE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 77
4.1.1. Evaluating policies
PROPOSITION 2. Assume all types have the same parameter ρ. Then v is a
valuation with parameter   = (1 − ρ)γ.
Proof. Let (c,l)
def = ς(π). By the time-invariance of ς, ς(Shπ) = Th(c,l) =
(eγhSh(c),Sh(l)). So, by homogeneity of U, v ◦ Sh = e(1−ρ)γhSh(v). Thus v is a
valuation with ah = 0 and bh = e(1−ρ)γh.
Proposition 2 and Theorem 2 imply now
COROLLARY 2. Assume all types have the same parameter ρ.I fW = S(v)
is G-differentiable on P at ¯ π, then for some q ∈ E , its differential equals 
e(ν−β+(1−ρ)γ)t q, δπ(t) dt.
Inasocietywithtype-dependentρ,classicalutilitarianismleadstoquestionable
implications; besides, it invalidates discounting:















and hence the weight in the welfare function of the types with the smallest ρ
approaches one as time goes to +∞.
There are other ways to express the same idea; e.g., that along any balanced
growth path, in an optimal redistribution of consumption goods (keeping the rest
ﬁxed) the fraction allocated to the agents with the smallest ρ converges to 1.
4.1.2. The discount rate for cost–beneﬁt analysis. In cost–beneﬁt analysis,
the effects of a variation in public policy are traditionally ﬁrst “monetized”, i.e.,
expressed as an equivalent perturbation of individual endowments of consumption
goods, here initially 0.
Let thus E be the Banach space M of measures16 on age-groups and types,
i.e., on ∪τ([0,T τ] ×{ τ}), with values in Rn (space of consumption bundles),
with ¯ π = 0 as baseline, where b ∈ B determines the endowment perturbation
ω(t) = e(γ+ν)tb ∈ M at t. Equivalently, express b in a unit-free way, letting, for
each set of agents S, b(S) equal the fraction of baseline aggregate consumption S
receives, good by good.
Policiesarethusendowmentperturbations,representingarbitraryﬂowsoflump-
sumrealtaxesandbeneﬁts.Thenwegetβ+ργ asthediscountratefor“aggregate”
resources ω(t),17 conﬁrming our simple calculation of Section 1.2:
COROLLARY 4. Assume all types have the same parameter ρ.I fW = S(v)
is G-differentiableon P at 0, then its differential equals, for some q ∈ M , 
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Proof. By construction, ¯ π = 0, so δπ = π and π(t) = e−(γ+ν)tω(t).
Remark 7. Clearly,choosingadifferentgrowthrateinthedeﬁnitionofω would
lead to the same corollary with a different discount rate. That statement would,
however, be empty, because there can be no outcome function: B being a neigh-
borhoodof0,chooseanegativemeasureb s.t.∀s ∈ [0,1],sb∈ B,andletψ = bφ
for some φ ∈ K with values in [0,1]. Then ψ is a policy, yet when it is shifted
sufﬁcientlyto±∞,thefeasiblesetunderthatpolicybecomesempty,byLemma6.
4.2. The Relative Utilitarian Approach
In this section we assume ν − β ∈ ZF.
As an alternative to classical utilitarianism, we suggest applying relative utili-
tarianism (RU),18 the social welfare functional where individual VNM utilities are
normalized between zero and one, and then summed. It is stressed in Dhillon and
Mertens (1999) that the RU-normalization of individual utilities has to be done on
some universal set A of acceptable alternatives, not speciﬁc to the problem under
consideration, and representing the constraints both of feasibility and of justice.19
Assumption 3. The set A of acceptable policies is shift-invariant and each
individual utility is bounded on A.
The boundedness is a minimal implication of justice; as to the shift-invariance,
it is clearly a property of feasibility, but in relation to justice it has a strong
meaning, that physical units (such as calories per day) are irrelevant. And without
it RU might lead to quite different conclusions. But it is straight in the spirit of
exogenous growth models—that (acceptable) policies affect only the height of the
growthpath,notthegrowthrate;anditisarguablyjustiﬁedinaworlddescribedby
such a model: e.g., if the absolute level of calories per day matter, utilities cannot
be homogeneous. And the latter is the key assumption ensuring time-invariance.
Hence the choice of an exogenous growth model here.
Assume thus vNM utility functions, and that ς is deﬁned on A—and hence v
too, by the deﬁnitions at the beginning of this section. Let MA denote the RU-
normalization, i.e., the operation on a proﬁle such that each individual utility is
normalized to have a range of size 1 on A.
DEFINITION 12. The relative utilitarian SWF is W = S(MA(v)).
RU’s anonymity axiom implies β = 0 in the speciﬁcation of S, Deﬁnition 8.
However, to allow for a richer model, incorporating, e.g., a nonzero probability of
the world ending tomorrow, β is not restricted here.
4.2.1. Evaluating policies. In a growing economy the RU-normalization
yields shift invariance, hence strict valuations:
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COROLLARY 5. TheRU-normalizedutilityofanagentoftypeτ onabalanced
growth path is independent of his birthdate.
Proof. Apply Proposition 3 to the case where the basic policy space is a sin-
gleton, which doesn’t do anything, and where the outcome function maps to the
chosen balanced growth path.
COROLLARY 6. If W = S(MA(v)) is G-differentiable on P at ¯ π, then its
differential equals

e(ν−β)t q,δπ(t) dt for some q ∈ E .
Proof. Proposition 3 and Theorem 2.
4.2.2. The discount rate for cost–beneﬁt analysis. As in Section 4.1.2, one
gets now, using Corollary 6, the discount rate β +γ for aggregate resources, even
for a population with variable ρτ:
COROLLARY 7. If W = S(MA(v)) is G-differentiable on P at 0, then its
differential equals

e−(β+γ)t q,ω(t) dt for some q ∈ M .
Restricting basic policies b to have all the same distribution over age-groups
andtypes,andsettingβ = 0,yieldsthenthemainresultinMertensandRubinchik
(2006).
The derived discount rate, γ, differs generically from the interest rate, even at
the golden rule equilibrium if ν is nonzero.
5. A VALUE-OF-LIFE ARGUMENT
One touchstone is the case β = 0: no discounting of utilities. Do the prescriptions
ofthetheorythenindeedcorrespondtotheintuitivemeaningoftreatingindividuals




The monetized value of life, according to any criteria [e.g., each of the four in
Mishan’s (1971) introduction, or even judicial criteria in assessing damages], is
proportional to the individual’s lifetime income.20
This is also formally true in the above economic model, when allowing for a
variable lifespan: individual lifetime utility is homogeneous, so willingness to pay
to extend life is proportional to lifetime income.
THEOREM 3. In the model of Section 3, extended by variable lifetimes, γ is
the only discount rate ensuring equal monetary value of human lives.
Proof. Let the lifetime utility, Uτ, be deﬁned on consumption and labor streams
of variable length, ∪T(Rn+m)[0,T]. Consider, for an agent of type τ, an optimal
lifetime consumption stream c of length T1 (including the labor coordinates, taken
say as negative), and let c  be the restriction of c to [0,T 0], with T0 <T 1.L e t
˜ c be expenditure-minimizing on [0,T 1] s.t. Uτ(˜ c) = Uτ(c ). Then  p,c − ˜ c  is80 JEAN-FRANC ¸OIS MERTENS AND ANNA RUBINCHIK
the monetary equivalent of the utility loss from (unanticipated) premature death.
Further, he leaves a debt (positive or negative) of  p,c  ; so, because  p,c =0,
the net monetary equivalent of the loss equals  p,c  −  p, ˜ c .
By homogeneity, and because in a BGE relative prices are constant under time
shift, when time is shifted by h and c is multiplied by eγh, c  and ˜ c get multiplied
by the same factor. Thus, the willingness to pay to avoid premature death21 is
proportional to eγx. The above computation could obviously have been done in
several different ways (e.g., for the case of anticipated death, let c  be an optimal
plan for a life length of T0), but all of them would lead to the same conclusion.
So, to treat individuals of all generations equally, future incomes must be
discounted exactly at rate γ, as implied by RU (Corollary 7).
This shows that the conclusions of relative utilitarianism and of Assumption 3
are correct in a world as described by this model.
Butmaybetheconclusionsdependcruciallyonthespecialfeaturesofthemodel
itself—exogenous growth, homogeneity, balanced growth? Else discounting may
no longer be valid as an exact derivative of welfare, but insofar as it is nevertheless
used, e.g., “as a ﬁrst approximation,” human lives should still be treated approxi-
mately equally. If then “value of life” does not decrease over time22 exponentially
fast to 0 as a proportion of lifetime income, the growth rate of per capita consump-
tion is still the only discount rate treating human lives approximately equally: for
any lower (resp. higher) rate, values of future lives would become exponentially
higher (resp. lower) than those of present human beings.
The above argument is valid even with variable or stochastic growth; it does,
however, refer to “average human life” at any given time.23 Else further quali-
ﬁcations would be needed in case income distribution became more and more
disperse. Thus we have the following theorem:
THEOREM 4. In a world where the ratio of average value of life to per capita
income is bounded away from 0 and ∞, discounting at the growth rate of per
capita income ensures that the present values of average human lives in different
periods are of the same order of magnitude.
6. THE CHOICE OF SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION
Given that classical and relative utilitarianism—together with Assumption 3—
havesuchdifferentimplicationsfordiscounting,wediscusssomeoftheunderlying
principles of equitable treatment of different generations that each incorporates.
Interestingly, in relative utilitarianism, the implication of a time-invariant set of
alternatives consistent with accepted public policy: the rate based on the relative
utilitarian criterion, γ ≈ 2%, falls exactly in the range, “between 1 and 3%” (cf.
Section 1.1), mandated by the U.S. OMB.
Remarkably, relative utilitarianism is also consistent with the “balanced gen-
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generationalaccounts[lifetimenettaxburdens]ofallfuturegenerationsareequal,
except for a growth adjustment.”
The discount rate β +ργ based on classical utilitarianism (Corollary 4) is well
known in the applied literature. Even if individual risk attitudes were identical
[far from the empirical ﬁndings; see Einav and Cohen (2007)], based on reported
estimates[e.g.,Dr` eze(1981)],implieddiscountrateswouldbefarabovetherange
suggested by the OMB. To get acceptable conclusions one has to set ρ close to
unity [e.g., Stern (2007, pp. 6–11)]. However, imposing individual elasticity or
risk preferences (ρ) contradicts any utilitarian foundation, because only the indif-
ference map is retained as an individual characteristic. But (neglecting society’s
rationality over risky prospects), it is consistent with a welfarist approach, ρ being
then viewed as a parameter of aggregation rather than an individual characteristic.
Note that imposing ρ = 1 means forcing the discount rate implied by Assumption
3 under RU.
The discount rate under classical utilitarianism depends on ρ because of the
presumption that marginal utility of income is independent of the environment
surrounding the individual. In particular, a 1% increase in real income of any of
our contemporaries has the same effect as it would 100 years ago for the same
individual with the same real income.
In contrast, RU, in the context of a growing economy, implies that to compare
individual utility differences, utilities must ﬁrst be normalized on the feasible
policies (consumption paths), which is time-invariant by Assumption 3. So the
social value of a 1% increase in real income of an individual at a given quantile
of the income distribution is independent of the date. Forcing logarithmic utilities,
as in Stern (2006), amounts to choosing the best possible approximation to this
under traditional welfarism, given his restriction to β ∼ 0.
However, relaxing this restriction, and viewing β as just an arbitrary parameter
of the welfare aggregator, one could obtain exactly the RU welfare function,
withoutdistortingindividualutilityfunctions(ρ),byusingatype-dependent(even
if probably negative!) discount factor on utilities, βτ = δ + (1 − ρτ)γ, with δ
the “probability that the world ends tomorrow” (compare Corollaries 3 and 6).
Adjusting β rather than ρ was advocated by Arrow24 (in the single type context
of the Stern report).
So RU provides a consistent methodology to aggregate correctly arbitrary (and
heterogeneous) individual lifetime preferences over lotteries, while keeping the
“ethical judgment” input completely independent of those, in the set of “feasible
and just alternatives”—i.e., in the realm of ethics and political philosophy, where
it belongs.
And it is easier and more objective to consider what are “just” laws rather than
to assign millions of individual utility weights. For example, for transfers, in the
form of income taxes, let y denote individual income as a percentage of per capita
income, and let ty denote the net tax (positive or negative), in the same units. (So
ty integrates to 0 under the income distribution µ.) Let the set of alternative tax
rates ty consist of {t |− t0 ≥ m, t  ≤ M, t convex and monotone},25 with the82 JEAN-FRANC ¸OIS MERTENS AND ANNA RUBINCHIK
minimal income m>0 and the maximal tax rate M<1,26,27 and conduct a
sensitivity analysis in terms of the parameters m and M—it is typically for those
that different interpretations of justice may give different bounds. This is easier
and clearer than in terms of the millions of welfare weights: the advantage of the
anonymity requirement on laws.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In general, welfare evaluations of policy changes in a growing OG economy entail
further challenges.
7.1. The Static Component of the Derivative
The problem of evaluating small policy changes, i.e., ﬁnding the derivative of
social welfare with respect to policy variations, is now reduced to the static one of
computing the linear functional q on the space of basic policies B.28
Observe that the result can hold only along a balanced growth path: else the
direction of q would be time-dependent, contrary to even a very broad deﬁnition
of “discounting” as in Mertens and Rubinchik (2010).
7.2. The Differentiability Assumption
Applicability of the results hinges on the existence of differentiable outcome
functions, as illustrated by Remark 7. For the case of endowment perturbations
(Corollaries 4 and 7), this would be a straight extension of Debreu’s classical
generic regularity theorem (1976). There are, however, several aspects that make
suchanextensionhighlynontrivial.First,itiswellknownthatOGmodelscangive
rise to indeterminacy; see, e.g., Kehoe and Levine (1984) and Geanakoplos and
Brown (1985). Next, even if regularity is ensured, already for the welfare function
to be well-deﬁned, the equilibrium has to be stable: the perturbed equilibrium has
to converge sufﬁciently fast back to the unperturbed solution, both at +∞ and at
−∞.
This program was successfully completed in Mertens and Rubinchik (2009)
for the most classical case (1 good, 1 type, etc.) of our model, ensuring thus at
least nonvacuity of our results. (Time starting at −∞ seems crucial there too.) We
think this should be extendable to the full model of Section 3.1, with policies as
in Section 4.1.2.
7.3. Permanent Changes
Our exclusion of permanent policy deviations, e.g., to a different constant policy
from the beginning of time (Section 2.1.1), does not necesarily exclude permanent
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some other constant policy; however, to satisfy the assumption ν − β ∈ ZF (in
Section 4.2), one then needs a natural restriction β>ν .
For evaluating permanent policy deviations, or the above when β ≤ ν, one
should reinterpret welfare functions in this paper as normalized, e.g., in per capita











as in this paper, is then only a higher-order term (of order 1/NT) in the expansion
of the above (w.r.t. NT), to ﬁne tune transitions. In fact, our restriction ν−β ∈ ZF
just ensures that the other terms vanish. This whole area remains to be explored;
we have no idea about the form of an asymptotic expansion, nor a fortiori about
the right way to differentiate it.
Because under RU, for constant policies π, Uτ
x(π) is independent of x (Corol-
lary 1 and Proposition 3), the above average immediately gives the SWF on
constant policies. But a conjecture that this Uτ might yield q, say as a derivative,
cannotwork:itisindependentofβ,whereasq shouldingeneraldependonβ:e.g.,
policies favoring the old will come out better with high discounting, because the
old were born earlier. This is why the heavier approach in Mertens and Rubinchik
(2009) was needed to get a handle on q analytically.
NOTES
1. Circular A-4 of the OMB [U.S. Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (2003)] mandates that all
executive agencies and establishments conduct a “regulatory analysis” for any new proposal, and more
speciﬁcally (pp.33–36),acost–beneﬁtanalysis,atratesofboth3%and7%.Bothratesarerationalized
there as “the” interest rate: the ﬁrst one relative to private savings, the second one relative to capital
formation and/or displacement, i.e., as the gross return on capital.
2. Other practitioners share this view; e.g., “Morally speaking, there is no difference between
current and future risk. Theories which, for example, attempt to discount effects on human health in
twentyyearstotheextentthattheyareequivalenttoonlyone-tenthofpresent-dayeffectsincost-beneﬁt
considerations are not acceptable” [Wildi et al. (2000)].
3. And it is not our purpose here to argue in favor or against. There may very well be good
arguments, e.g., for rather using the population growth rate to discount.
4. “How far we are to consider the interests of posterity when they seem to conﬂict with those
of existing human beings? Perhaps, however, it is clear that the time at which a man exists cannot
affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view; and that the interests of posterity
must concern a Utilitarian as much as those of his contemporaries, except in so far as the effect of
his actions on posterity—and even the existence of human beings to be affected—must necessarily be
more uncertain.”
5. Aggregation of utility differences is also why strong Pareto and Ramsey’s anonymity can be
combined here, avoiding the impossibility results of, e.g., Basu and Mitra (2003) and Crespo et al.
(2009). The literature in welfare economics and social choice offers diverse ways to construct welfare
criteria by weakening one of the two desiderata. Koopmans (1960) axiomatizes discounting utilities,
or “social impatience.” Several authors are concerned with incorporating intergenerational justice
principles into a social welfare criterion. Chichilnisky (1996) offers the “no dictatorship of the past”
and “no dictatorship of the future” axioms (describing “sustainable preferences”) and shows that the
resulting welfare criterion is inconsistent with a sum of discounted utilities. Asheim et al. (2006) and84 JEAN-FRANC ¸OIS MERTENS AND ANNA RUBINCHIK
d’Aspremont(2007)showtheexistenceofwelfarefunctionssatisfyingsomeofKoopmans’spostulates
of intergenerational equity, but still, in particular, Chichilnisky’s axioms. For alternative formulations
of ethically acceptable allocations see, e.g., Asheim (1991) and Fleurbaey and Michel (2003).
6. Determinacy (cf. Section. 7) is a must for any form of comparative statics.
7. This poses novel questions concerning the above model, especially how to specify correctly
initial conditions at −∞. This is addressed in Section. 3.1, because those initial conditions are crucial
to our argument (in Proposition. 1); informally, there can be no balanced growth in the presence of
natural resources.
8. See Dhillon and Mertens (1999) for axiomatization.
9. For the United States, e.g., according to Johnston and Williamson (2007), the average until
2006 is 2.1% since 1950, 1.9% since 1900 or 1850, 2% since 1869, the ﬁrst year when data become
reliable (loc.cit.), especially for growth computations, because by then both colonial expansion and
the immediate aftermath of the Civil War were over.
10. K[= KR] is deﬁned in Schwartz (1957–1959) or Gel’fand and Shilov (1959).
11. Implying that the integrals exist, as improper wide Denjoy integrals (cf. note. 13).
12. One can deﬁne in the same way IWAs on any shift-invariant subspace of R
 ×R
(e.g., inte-
grable functions). This may sometimes be more convenient, but we will not need this generalization
here.
13. The reader is welcome to think of any other type of integral (say, Lesbegue), as no properties
possessed solely by the wide Denjoy integral are used in the paper. The basic reason for using Denjoy
integration is the capital-accumulation equation in Section. 3.1 below, to be sure any solution of its
differential equation form is also one of the integral form, and then to systematically use always
the same integration theory on R. No harm is done by sticking with the most encompassing one, in
particular,inthiscase,wherearequirementofabsolutesummabilitywouldhavenoeconomicmeaning
whatsoever.
14. Assumed to hold a.e., and implying the conditions for it to be meaningful: Ki
t is assumed
locally a Denjoy primitive and Ii
t locally Denjoy-integrable.
15. Clearly this also needs some form of stability, else as the amount of shifting grows, the
corresponding equilibria might slowly get out of the speciﬁed neighborhood. However, for the
welfare differential to exist in this model, much more stringent stability properties are needed
anyway.
16. Or the absolutely continuous measures (L1), or those with continuous densities.
17. More precisely, the “welfare value” of the aggregate endowment perturbation at time t, 
τ qτ,ωτ





t (ds)], is discounted at this rate.
18. The axiomatization [Dhillon and Mertens (1999)] is for a ﬁnite set of agents.
19. Justice including in particular the anonymity requirement on laws. Diamond’s critique was
probably treated too lightly loc.cit., by essentially siding with Harsanyi, and is a source of recurrent
questions and objections. It rests upon a confusion between on one side intuitive concepts of justice—
e.g.,in thiscase, anonymityoflaws—,which aredescribedbythe“setoffeasible andjustallocations,”
and on the other requirements for correct aggregation, which are described by the RU axioms. The
“wrong”alternativeinhisexampleisdismissedessentiallybecauseitinvolvesunjust(nonanonymous)
laws, not because it involves an incorrect utility calculus.
20. Even a claim that from the point of view of society, it would be proportional to average lifetime
income at his time would leave our argument below intact.
21. Oherwaystocomputea“valueoflife,”suchasfullyanticipatedlifespans,oraddingthewelfare
effect on the rest of society, lead to the same theorem.
22. Spending for life extension cannot be invoked as a measure of its value, because it might very
well increase with the probability of success of treatments. But because this probability is bounded
above, it can be invoked for the asymptotic behavior.
23. As opposed to the “social value of a speciﬁc individual’s life” at that time, which presumably
depends also on his contribution to society in the rest of his life.
24. Personal recollection from private conversation.
25. Thus ty ≤ 0f o ry ≤ 1 (we assume feasibility, i.e., m ≤ M).DISCOUNT RATE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 85
26. To illustrate the positive aspect of this approach, consider the change of attitudes toward justice
reﬂected by the passage of the sixteenth amendment in the United States.
27. So, to normalize utilities, the minimal and maximal after-tax incomes at y are wy = y +
X(1 − y) with X = M for y ≥ 1a n dX = m else, and ¯ wy = y + M







min(x,y)µ(dx),w h e r ez+ def = max(z,0).
28. Mertens and Rubinchik (2009) obtain q in the classical case of our model, with policies as in
Section 4.1.2.
29. Conceptually our “initial condition” is best thought of as a pair: on the one hand, a general
form, say something like Kt bounded at −∞, provided one can prove from this convergence at
−∞, and on the other hand, a speciﬁc assumption to ensure balanced growth, i.e., that the limit
is 0.
30. Independently of the natural requirement that for natural resources (e.g., mining), Y should
force Ii ≤ 0, and for land (raw acreage), Ii = 0.
31. Note that for m = 1 this bound is attained, so the strong no-rabbit condition is best possible:
else, under the “weak” initial condition, there exist feasible paths with  kt  unbounded at −∞,a n d
for any ﬁxed t the set of feasible Kt is unbounded.
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APPENDIX A: AN EQUATION WITH
SHIFT OPERATORS
LEMMA 8. Let E be a set, with maps Sh: E → E s.t. Sh1 ◦Sh2 = Sh1+h2.L e tV be the
space of functions of time with values in R
n
; note that Sh operates on V by Deﬁnition 2.1.
For ϕ: E → V, assume that ∀h ∃ah ∈ Rn, bh ∈ R++, both Lebesgue measurable in h,s . t .
ϕ ◦ Sh = ah + bhSh ◦ ϕ.
Then∃ζ ∈ RandA ∈ Rn suchthat∀h,onecantakebh = eζh,a h = A
eζh−1
eζ−1 ,thefraction
being deﬁned by continuity if ζ = 0.
ζ is not unique iff ∃α ∈ Rn: ϕi
e(t) ∈ R ⇒ ϕi
e(t) = αi, the superscript denoting the
coordinate. When ζ is unique, Ai is unique iff ∃e,t: ϕi
e(t) ∈ R.
Proof. Let h = h1 + h2.T h e nϕ ◦ Sh = ah2 + bh2[Sh2 ◦ (ah1 + bh1Sh1 ◦ ϕ)]. So
ah + bhSh ◦ ϕ = ah2 + bh2ah1 + bh2bh1Sh ◦ ϕ.
If, for some pair h1,h 2, bh  = bh1bh2, then whenever (Sh ◦ ϕ)i
e(t) ∈ R, the above
equation determines its value, say αi. The same obviously holds then for ϕ itself. For
such a ϕ, one can set ah = 0, bh = 1 ∀h; thus we can always assume bh1+h2 = bh1bh2.
Because bh > 0, taking logarithms reduces it to f(x+ y) = f(x)+ f(y),o fw h i c h
it is well known that any Lebesgue-measurable solution is linear [Fr´ echet (1913)]. Thus
bh = eζh.
As to ah, for each i,i f∃e,t: (Sh ◦ ϕ)i






we can assume that the above equation holds always. The same argument as above implies
then the result in the case ζ = 0. And for ζ  = 0, we get ah2 + ah1eζh2 = ah1 + ah2eζh1,
i.e., ah1(eζh2 − 1) = ah2(eζh1 − 1). This implies ﬁrst a0 = 0, hence the result for h = 0,
and next that, for all h1, h2 different from 0, ahi/(eζhi − 1) is independent of i,s o
ah
eζh−1 is
constant over all h  = 0. Because ζ  = 0, we can write this constant as
A
eζ−1, thus ﬁnishing
the proof, the uniqueness part being elementary.
APPENDIX B: PROOFS
B.1. THE SPACE K E
This section is to enable a more convenient laguage (in Lemma 9) for the statement of the
main result: else all topological concepts there (like continuity, Gˆ ateaux-differentiability,
density) would have to be given a more complex “sequential” reinterpretation, entailing in
addition a slight loss of generality (any case covered by that theorem would also be by the
present one, endowing F with the weak topology generated by the sequentially continuous
linear functionals).
Proof of Remark 1. Obviously, for ϕ ∈ KE, f ◦ ϕ ∈ KR. Conversely, because f ◦ ϕ
is C∞ for all f ∈ E∗, ϕ is C∞ with values in E [e.g., Edwards (1965, Ex.8.14, p.609)].
Because further each f ◦ ϕ has compact support, it is elementary that ϕ has compact
support.88 JEAN-FRANC ¸OIS MERTENS AND ANNA RUBINCHIK
DEFINITION 13. The topology on KE is the strongest locally convex topology s.t. ϕn
in KE converges to 0 iff ϕn and its successive derivatives converge uniformly to 0 and
∃h ∈ R: ϕn(x) = 0for |x| ≥ h.
LEMMA 9. The topology on KE is uniquely deﬁned, and KE is an LF space [e.g.,
Kelley and Namioka (1963; 22C p. 218)]. A sequence in KE converges to 0 i f fi ti sa si n
Deﬁnition 13. A linear map to a locally convex space is continuous iff it is sequentially so.
Proof. The Kn ={ ϕ ∈ KE || x|≥n ⇒ ϕ(x) = 0}, endowed with the topology
of uniform convergence of all derivatives, are an increasing sequence of Fr´ echet spaces
(using Remark 1, or directly), with Kn topologically a closed subspace of Kn+1. Thus the
speciﬁed topology is the strongest locally convex topology s.t. the inclusions Kn ⊆ KE
are continuous: this is the inductive limit topology T [Kelley and Namioka (1963; 16Cb
p. 149)], and also [Kelley and Namioka (1963; 22C p.218)] the inductive limit (KE,T ) is
an LF space, and is a strict inductive limit [Kelley and Namioka (1963; 17Gb p.164)].
For the second sentence: a convergent sequence is bounded, hence contained in
some Kn [Kelley and Namioka (1963; 17Gb.iii p.164)]. Hence it is as speciﬁed, using
[Kelley and Namioka (1963; 17Gb.i p.164)]. The last sentence follows now straight from
Deﬁnition 13.
B.2. THE MAIN THEOREM
Proof of Theorem 1. If ζ is not uniquely determined, Lemma 1 implies that W is, on
every straight line through ¯ π, constant in a neighborhood of ¯ π. Letting q = 0 thus makes
t h er e s u l tt r u ef o ra n yζ.
Else there exists, by deﬁnition of a Gˆ ateaux differential, µ ∈ F ∗ s.t.
DW¯ π(δπ) = lim
ε→0
W(¯ π + εδπ)− W(¯ π)
ε
=  µ,δπ . (B.1)
Start with the particular case E = R and F = K,u s i n gK for KR.
By Lemma 1, W ◦Sh = eζhW +A
eζh−1
eζ−1 ; hence by constancy of ¯ π (S¯ π = ¯ π), and (B.1),
 µ,Sh(δπ) =e
ζh µ,δπ .
Because B is a neighborhood of ¯ π,e v e r yϕ ∈ K is a multiple of some δπ; hence the
following holds for all h ∈ R and all ϕ ∈ K:
 µ,ϕ − e
−ζhShϕ =0.
Dividing by h and taking the limit (in K !) as h → 0 yields
 µ,ϕ
  + ζϕ =0.












 ,ϕ =0,∀ϕ ∈ K.DISCOUNT RATE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 89
By Gel’fand and Shilov (1959; p. 53), the equation ζµ− µ  = 0h a sµ = qeζt for some
q ∈ R as only solutions in K∗,s o




ζtδπtdt,∀δπ ∈ K. (B.2)
The next step is to extend the result to any Banach space E and F = KE.
LEMMA 10. Any function ϕ ∈KE can be approximated in KE by functions with ﬁnite-
dimensional range.




| 0 ≤ i ≤ n, j ∈ Z}. Dn is an increasing sequence of ﬁnite
subsets of E.L e tFn be the subspace spanned by Dn and pn a projector from E to Fn (i.e.,
pn: E → Fn is the identity on Fn). Its existence follows from Hahn–Banach, Fn being
ﬁnite-dimensional. Then ϕn = pn ◦ ϕ ∈ KFn and converges in KE to ϕ.
Consider policy variations δπ ∈ KE of the form bφ: t  → bφ(t)with b ∈ E and φ ∈ K.
By (B.1) and (B.2), ∀b ∈ E ∃qb ∈ R s.t.  µ,bφ =qb

φ(t)eζtdt ∀φ ∈ K.S o ,f o r
Iφ =

φ(t)eζtdt  = 0, the map b  → qb =
 µ,bφ 
Iφ is in E∗, i.e., qb =  q,b  with q ∈ E∗.





Because any ϕ ∈ KE with ﬁnite-dimensional range is a sum of policy variations of the
form bφ, (B.3) remains true for them by linearity. They being dense in KE by Lemma 10,
(B.3) extends by continuity to KE.
Finally, we extend the result to arbitrary F.
Because Gˆ ateaux differentials are continuous linear functionals, all assumptions remain
true and ZF is unchanged with the weak topology on F, which is locally convex. The
assumptiononF (Deﬁnition1.1)andLemma9implythenthattheinclusionmapKE ⊆ F is
continuous.Hence,Gˆ ateauxdifferentiabilityonF impliesthatonKE.Thustheassumptions
of the theorem hold on KE too. So the differential is a continuous linear functional on F,
given on KE by the formula

 q,ϕ(t) eζtdt. This being by assumption continuous on F,
the differential on F must coincide with it, KE being dense in F.
B.3. OTHER PROOFS
ProofofLemma4. Because Sh ¯ π = ¯ π, W(Shπ) = Vc,r(v(Shπ) − v(Sh ¯ π));b y
Deﬁnition 6, Lemma 2, homogeneity of Vc,r, Deﬁnition 7, and Lemma 3,
W(Sh(π)) = Vc,r(e
 hSh(v(π) − v(¯ π))) = e
 hrVc,r(Sh(v(π) − v(¯ π)))
= ahe
 hr + e




Proof of Lemma 6. Because the closed convex cone Y is pointed (irreversibility), there
exists a linear functional α whose unique maximizer on Y is 0. Then  α,y ≤− ε y  on
Y; i.e., by rescaling α,  α,y ≤−   y . Observe too that free disposal implies that α> > 0.
Write α as (αL,αK,αI,αC).
The ﬁrst step is to establish the bound on K sub (ii).
Fixavector ¯ L ∈ Rh s.t.anyfeasiblevectoroflaborinputsLt ≤ ¯ Le(γ+ν)t (i.e.,tocompute
a given coordinate of ¯ L, assume that all agents spend 100% of their time on that activity).90 JEAN-FRANC ¸OIS MERTENS AND ANNA RUBINCHIK
Allow perfect substitution at rates αI between all investment goods and between all
capital goods: let F : R2
+ → R+: (¯ κ,λ)  → sup{ αI,I |∃ K ≥ 0, αI,K ≤¯ κ,
(−λ ¯ L,−K,I,0) ∈ Y}.
The sup is ﬁnite, because  αI,I ≤  αK,K +λ αL, ¯ L  and  αK,K  is bounded on
the compact set K ≥ 0, αI,K ≤¯ κ (recall α> > 0). Further the sup is achieved, the
sets {y ∈ Y |  α,y ≥− M} being compact (because then  y ≤M), so that the sup
is effectively over a compact set. Clearly F is positively homogeneous of degree 1 and
concave, and is continuous again because locally everything happens within a compact
subset of Y.
Thus by homogeneity F(¯ κ,λ) = λϕ(
¯ κ
λ),w h e r eϕ(x) = F(x,1) is concave, ≥ 0, and
continuous. Further, by the “no-rabbit” assumption, F(¯ κ,0) = 0, so, by continuity of F,
ϕ(x)
x → 0a t∞.
For any feasible path (Lt,K t,I t,C t),l e t˜ ιt =  αI,I t  and ˜ κt =  αI,K t . Then, because
δ ≤ δi and K ≥ 0, the capital-accumulation equation implies that ˜ κ 
t ≤ ˜ ιt − δ˜ κt; further,
Lt ≤ ¯ Le(γ+ν)t implies (free-disposal) ˜ ιt ≤ e(γ+ν)tϕ(e−(γ+ν)t˜ κt). So with (lt,κ t,ι t,c t) =
e−(γ+ν)t(Lt, ˜ κt,˜ ιt,C t):
κ
 
t ≤ ϕ(κt) − Rκt.
To bound  kt , it sufﬁces to prove from this that κt is bounded by some constant
independent of the feasible path, because αI > > 0.
Also, the initial condition yields that eRtκt converges exponentially fast to 0 at −∞; i.e.,
because R>0, there exists ε:0<ε<Rsuch that, with r = R − ε>0, ertκt → 0a t
−∞ along a subsequence. Because
ϕ(x)
x → 0a t∞, there exists A s.t., ∀x, ϕ(x) ≤ A+εx;
so κ 
t ≤ A − rκt.
The next step is to prove from this that κt ≤ ¯ K, with ¯ K = A/r.
Otherwise κt0 > ¯ K for some t0; because κ 
t < 0f o rκt > ¯ K, this implies that κt > ¯ K
and is decreasing for t ≤ t0. Deﬁne y by y 
t = A − ryt with the prescribed terminal value
κt0 at t0. The relations for κ and y are equivalent to
rd









dt(ertyt):f o rt ≤ t0, κt ≥ yt = A/r +(κt0 −A/rer(t0−t),
contradicting that ertκt → 0a t−∞ along a subsequence.
Hence the uniform bound on  kt .
Next,  α,y ≤−   y  yields
 b
a  it dt ≤
 b
a ( αL,l t + αK,k t − αI,i t − αC,c t )dt.







t with Rj = γ + ν + δj as before, so that
 b
a  αI,i t dt =
 b













t dt ≥−   αI,k a , because Rj > 0. Thus
our bounds on kt and lt imply that
 b
a  it dt ≤ ¯ K(b− a + 1) for some constant ¯ K.








n=0 e−Rjn  n+1
n |i
j
t−x|dx is uniformly bounded by (ii). For Mi
t = eδitKi
t, the dif-











sds. And the initial condition yields limt→−∞ Mi
t = 0, so Mi
−∞ = 0;
hence (i).
Proof of Proposition 1. Comparing the rescaling of consumption goods in the con-
sumption sets (ii) and in the production set (iii) shows that the mass of any agent is to be
multipliedbyC = eνh.Forlaborgoods,thisratioiscorrecttoo,giventhelabor-savingtech-
nological growth included in aggregate effective labor. By (i), the “induced map of agents”
mapsanindividualoftypeτ bornattimet toanindividualofthesametypebornatt+h,soDISCOUNT RATE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 91
thepopulationoftheneweconomyattimet isthatoftheoldattimet−hmultipliedbyeνh,
and hence equals that of the original economy at t: the population measure is preserved. It
thus remains only to prove that preferences are preserved and that allocations are mapped
to allocations: the one-to-one and onto aspect will then follow from the same property for
the inverse T−h. Consumption sets are unchanged: at any t nonnegativity constraints are
preserved by the rescalings (ii), also, time fractions are not rescaled, so the constraint that
their sum be ≤ 1 is preserved too. Preferences are homogeneous in the consumption goods,
so they are preserved by rescaling (ii). As for production, capital accumulation equations
are linear in capital and investment, so they are preserved given (iii), as well as the initial
condition (also in its weak form of Proposition. 4): both convergence to 0 and exponential
convergence to 0 are preserved under shifting and multiplication by a constant. And Y is
unchanged under scaling by e(γ+ν)h (iii).
Proof of Corollary 3. Let Vc =

τ V τ
c ,w h e r eV τ0








t (π) − ¯ uτ
t

dt. Applying Corollary 2 to each
V τ
c , i.e., to the economy in which utilities of all types but τ are identically zero, one obtains



















Visibly the criterion qτ of the types with the smallest ρ asymptotically gets all the
weight.
Proof of Proposition 3. Shift invariance of A implies T-invariance of the set of the
induced (acceptable) allocations under an outcome function ς; thus if ς(π) = (c,l) for
some π ∈ A,t h e n∀hς ( Shπ) = (eγhShc,Shl),a n dShπ ∈ A. So the utility difference
between the worst and best acceptable allocations for an agent of type τ is, by homogeneity




x).Hence,becauseς ◦Sh = Th◦ς ande−γxThcτ
x =
Sh(e−γxcτ





APPENDIX C: INITIAL CONDITIONS
Even with the weakest initial condition, say Kt bounded at −∞, one should expect Ki
t to
converge to 0 at −∞ if δi > 0. But land and natural resources are the typical examples of
goods with δi = 0, so the natural value for δ in a general form of the initial condition and
Lemma 6 is 0.29 The initial condition is thus a bit too stringent conceptually, requiring ex-
ponential convergence to the initial value 0 instead of just plain convergence. An additional
reason to want just plain convergence there is that then the “initial condition” becomes
equivalent to the initial condition for the integral formula of Kt in terms of It: even with




−∞ eδi(s−t)Ii(s)ds implies Ki
t → Ki
−∞ at −∞.30 We make a ﬁrst
attempt here to address this issue.
LEMMA 11.
(i) Every β> > 0 in Rm is the αI of some linear functional α having a unique maximizer
on Y.92 JEAN-FRANC ¸OIS MERTENS AND ANNA RUBINCHIK
(ii) For α> > 0,l e tψα(x) = sup{ α,I |∃ K ≥ 0, K ≤x,




x2 dx is ﬁnite iff the same integral
is ﬁnite replacing ψα(x) by ϕα(x)
def = sup{ α,I |∃ K ≥ 0, α,K ≤x,(− ¯ L,−K,
I,0) ∈ Y}.
Proof. For point (i), let E be the commodity space Rh ×Rm ×Rm ×Rn, containing Y,
with vectors typically denoted (−L,−K,I,C).L e tF be the subspace where L = C = 0,
and let β  extend β with arbitrary positive K-coordinates. Let G ={ x ∈ F |  β ,x =0}.
Bytheno-rabbitassumption,G∩Y ={ 0}.Byirreversibility,thereexistsalinearfunctional
γ on E having a unique maximizer on Y;s oY   ={ y ∈ Y |  γ,y ≤− 1} and Gare disjoint
closed convex sets, with disjoint asymptotic cones: their difference is a closed convex set
disjoint from 0; hence they can be strictly separated. So there is a linear functional α with
 α,G  >  α,Y   .Gbeingasubspace,thisimpliesthatα vanishesonG,andhas0asunique
maximizer on Y. Thus some positive multiple of α coincides with β  on F; in particular,
αI = β.
For point (ii), observe ﬁrst that the integrability condition on ϕα(x) is equivalent to
that on ϕα(cx),f o ra n yc>0. Now, K ≥ 0a n dα> > 0 imply that  α,K  is a norm,
so for any norm there exist c > 0a n d¯ c such that c K ≤  α,K ≤¯ c K .T h e
independencefromcoftheconditiononϕα allowsthentoreplacethatinnerproductby K .
Similarly, to replace ¯ L by a vector of 1’s, ﬁrst majorize and minorize it by a multiple of this
vector.
As the proof of Lemma 6 shows, the “no-rabbit” condition is equivalent to ϕ(x)/x → 0, so
the condition
 ∞
1 [ϕ(x)/x2]dx < ∞ appears as a very slight strengthening. This justiﬁes
the following:




x2 dx < ∞ for
some α> > 0.
PROPOSITION 4. Provided that the strong no-rabbit condition holds, the conclusions
of Lemma 6 remain true when weakening the exponentially fast convergence to plain
convergence in the initial condition.
Proof. Fix α according to the strong no-rabbit condition, and, using Lemma 11.i to ﬁnd
a corresponding α in the proof of Lemma 6, follow that proof until where ϕ (= ϕα)i s
majorized by A + εx, and now let f(x)= Rx − ϕ(x), ¯ K = inf{k | f(k)>0},a n dﬁ xa
corresponding κt0.
Then, prove ﬁrst that, for t ≤ t0, κt ≥ yt, with yt the solution of y 
t = ϕ(yt) − Ryt
with prescribed value at t0: reversing time, and translating t0 to 0, we have, using xt for κt,
x 
t ≥ f(x t) a.e., y 
t = f(y t) a.e., x0 = y0, f(x 0)>0, f is increasing for x ≥ x0, and need
to show xt ≥ yt for t>0. Translating f and the functions x, y, we can even assume that
x0 = y0 = 0, f(0)>0, so f is positive and increasing on R+.S oH(x)=
 x
0 [1/f(y)]dy
is well-deﬁned, positive, C1, concave, and increasing on R+. Assuming the chain rule for
differentiation established for the composition H ◦x of such an H with a Denjoy primitive
like xt, we obtain (H ◦x) 




F(xt) ≥ 1, and similarly (H ◦y) 
t = 1; hence, for
t ≥ 0, H(xt) ≥ H(yt) and so xt ≥ yt by strict monotonicity of H.
Thus indeed κt ≥ yt for t ≤ t0. Because further κt and yt are decreasing and continuous
on that range, they have continuous and decreasing inverse functions tκ and ty deﬁned
on [κt0,∞[ and values in ]−∞,t 0], and there tκ ≥ ty.N o wy 
t =− f(y t) means that
dy
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But the “weak” initial condition is that eRtκ(t)−−−−−→
t→−∞
















−∞, with a = max{1,κ t0}.




z(Rz−ϕ(z)) →∞ , and hence, ϕ(z) being negligible




z2 →∞ , contradicting the strong no-rabbit condition
by Lemma 11.ii. Thus indeed κt ≤ ¯ K ∀t. The rest of the proof of Lemma 6 remains
as is.